) then changing the outcome of that branch (z, 1992; Luce & Fishburn, 1991; Miyamoto, 1989; Wakker, 1993 Wakker, , 1994 Weber, 1994; Schmeidler, 1989; p(z) ) should not affect the preference order induced by Tversky & Kahneman, 1992; Yaari, 1987) . the other probability-outcome combinations.
The present experiment uses gambles with three Birnbaum et al. (1992, pp. 338-339) found that ($8, equally likely outcomes, denoted (x, y, z) . These three .5; z, .5) received higher judgments than ($16, .1; $5, amounts are written on slips that will be mixed and .4; z, .5) for values of z ú $20; however, the order of drawn at random from a container. If slip 1 is drawn, the mean judgments was reversed for values of z £ the prize is x; if slip 2 is drawn, the prize is y; if slip 3 $20, thus violating branch independence. This result is drawn, the prize is z. In this case, branch indepencould be explained by the rank-dependent, configuraldence can be written: weight model of . Weber, Anderson, and Birnbaum (1992) found similar results for ratings of the attractiveness of gambles. However, Wakker, Erev, and Weber (1994) found little evidence of (x, y, z) preferred to (x, y, z) if and only if (x, y, z) preferred to (x, y, z) .
(1) violations of branch independence with direct choices between gambles; they found no evidence to favor rankdependent utility theories over EU theory.
Theories in which the weights of stimulus compo-In other words, replacing the common outcome z with nents depend on their ranks have become more popular z should not affect the direction of preference between in recent years to explain violations of independence. (x, y) and (x, y) . For this situation (with fixed probabil- Birnbaum, Parducci, and Gifford (1971) and Birnbaum ities), branch independence is equivalent to joint inde- (1974) proposed configural-weight averaging models to pendence (Krantz, Luce, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971, p. account for deviations from constant-weight averaging 339). models in psychophysical and social information integration tasks. Birnbaum (1974, p. 559 ) noted, ''The con-
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
figural-weight averaging model assumes that the weight of a stimulus depends on its rank within the It is useful to analyze the present experiment with set to be judged.'' In the case of judgments of likeablerespect to generic, rank-dependent configural weight ness of a person based on their personality traits or of theory, and to discuss related theories with respect to the morality of a person based on their deeds, judgthat theory. According to this theory, the weights of ments were theorized to depend mostly on the person's equally likely outcomes depend entirely on their ranks. worst trait or deed, respectively (Birnbaum, 1972 , Since there are three ranks in our three-outcome gam-1973; Riskey & Birnbaum, 1974; Birnbaum, Wong, & bles, there are three weights, for Lowest, Medium, and Wong, 1976) .
Highest ranking outcomes (w L , w M , and w H , respec- Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) proposed revisions to tively). In this case, weights can be normalized to sum configural weight theory and showed that it could exto one by dividing by their total. Consider the preferplain judgments of buying and selling prices of uncerence relation, ¥, between two such gambles, with a common value of z that is the lowest outcome in either tain prospects (used cars), based on information from gamble. Outcomes are chosen such that 0 õ z õ x õ sources of varied credibility and bias (see also Birn- x õ y õ y õ z. Suppose baum & Stegner, 1981; Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983) . Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed a model of choice between risky prospects that used rank and (z, x, y) ¥ (z, x, y). sign-dependent weights. Quiggin (1982) introduced a rank-dependent theory in economics. Luce and Narens According to the rank-dependent model, this prefer-(1985) showed for binary gambles that a rank-depenence relation will hold if and only if dent utility theory is the most general type of a configural weight theory that yields interval scales of utility, w L u(z) / w M u(x) / w H u (y) and that rank-dependent theory can explain many of ú w L u(z) / w M u(x) / w H u(y), (2) the paradoxes that had been considered evidence against Expected Utility theory. Rank dependent weighting has been adocated or investigated in a numwhere w L , w M , and w H are the weights of the lowest, ber of other recent papers Birnmedium, and highest outcomes, respectively, and u(x) baum & Sutton, 1992; Birnbaum & Sotoodeh, 1991 ; is the utility function of money. Subtracting w L u (z) from both sides leaves: Champagne & Stevenson, 1994; Lopes, 1990; Luce, w M u(x) / w H u(y) ú w M u(x) / w H u(y) Table 1 presents an analysis of the stimuli that were employed in Design 1 of the present experiment. Note that a wide range pair (x, y) is compared to a series Therefore of smaller range pairs (x, y) that vary in their totals (x / y). Each entry in the table shows the ratio of differw M [u(x) 0 u(x)] ú w H [u(y) 0 u(y)] ences in utility as in Expressions 6 and 7. If the ratio of weights exceeds the ratio of utility differences in the hence, table, then the gamble containing the smaller range pair (x, y) will be preferred to the one containing the w M w H ú u(y) 0 u(y) u(x) 0 u(x) .
(3) larger range pair (x, y) when the common outcome is z; if the ratio of weights is less than the given ratio, then the gamble containing the wider range pair will Now suppose that there is a violation of branch indebe preferred. Four examples of utility functions are pendence when the common outcome is changed from listed in Table 1 , to illustrate how violations of branch the lowest to the highest outcome in both gambles (0 independence depend on both the pattern of weights õ x õ x õ y õ y õ z). In this case, the preference and the utility function, as in Expressions 6 and 7. relation would be as follows:
If the weights of Lowest, Medium, and Highest ranks are equal or stand in any fixed ratio (e.g., 4:2:1, 9:3:1, (x, y, z) ≥ (x, y, z).
1:1:1, 1:2:4), there will be no violations of branch independence between cases of the common outcome being This relation will hold if and only if lowest or highest. In a finite experiment such as Table  1 , the ratios of weights must ''straddle'' the ratios of
differences in utility specified by the experiment to produce a violation of branch independence. (Note: Chang-
(4) ing the common outcome to the middle value can also produce violations of branch independence; derivations This expression implies follow the same approach as Eqs. (2-7). Extensions to situations in which outcomes are varied in probability
and the number of outcomes is changed are described in Appendix B). therefore, Expected Utility Theory
(5) Expected Utility (EU) theory assumes equal weights for all ranks, so EU theory and Savage's SEU predict no violations of branch independence. The psychological This analysis shows that if the ratios of weights of version of SEU theory (Edwards, 1954) , which uses a adjacent ranks are equal, then there would be no violaweighting function of probability, would also have the tions in any experiment due to any change in common same implication, because three equally probable outcome from lowest to highest (z to z). In order to events are also equal in weight. (In this experiment, observe this violation of branch independence, the rabranch independence and event independence cointios of successive weights must ''straddle'' the ratio of cide). differences in utility as follows:
Editing and Cancellation Theory Suppose the subject were to edit comparisons be-
(6) tween gambles by canceling any equal probability, equal outcome that is common to both gambles. Such By reversing the preference relations and inequalities a subject would be following Savage's axiom, whether in the above derivation, one can see that the opposite motivated by a principle of rationality or by a desire to pattern of violations of branch independence will occur simplify the decision problem. The theory that subjects when the following holds: edit and cancel equal aspects in making choices has been proposed by Tversky (1969; , elaborated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , and reiterated by Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1992) . If subjects canceled com- Note. Entries in the last four columns show ratios of differences in utility:
According to rank-dependent theory, branch independence will be violated between the cases in which z is smallest or largest when the ratios of successive weights ''straddle'' the ratios specified by the experiment and the utility function. For example, if u(x) Å x, then (z, $40, $44) will be preferred over (z, $10, $98), for z õ $10 and ($10, $98, z) will be preferred over ($40, $44, z) for z ú $98 if w L /w M õ 1.8 õ w M /w H . mon outcomes, there would be no violations of branch In this case, the smaller range pair (x, y) will be preferred to (x, y) in the first two rows of Table 1 ; there independence, apart from random error. Because this strategy might apply to choice but not to independent will be a violation of branch independence in the third row; and the last three rows would have consistent judgment, it might be possible to observe violations of branch independence in a judgment task (as in Birn-preferences for the gambles containing the wider range, (x, y) pair of higher expected value. baum et al., 1992), but not in a choice task (as in Wakker et al., 1994) . Figure 1 illustrates the predictions of these parameters by showing the equivalent cash value of each gam-It is also possible that a cancellation strategy might be induced by the context within the experiment, if ble as a function of the common outcome, z. The gamble with the higher ordinate value should be preferred, most of the trials involved comparisons that would permit such a cancellation. There is evidence that the according to the theory. The crossing of the curves shows a violation of branch independence. model that represents subjects' judgments can actually change, depending on the distribution of stimuli pre-For the same weights, assuming a square root function for utility, the pattern is similar but now the rever-sented to the subjects, so this concern should not be taken lightly (see Mellers, Ordóñ ez, & Birnbaum, 1992 , sal is predicted to occur in the fifth row of the table, Experiment 3). The present experiment was designed to include a large number of ''filler'' judgments in which all six outcomes were distinct, so that fewer than half of the choices involved comparisons in which a cancellation would be possible. Wakker et al. (1994) used an experimental design in which all of the choices included at least one common branch.
Rank-Dependent Utility Theory
Suppose u(x) Å x. If the weights stand in the ratios of 3:2:1 for Low, Medium, and High ranks, then a violation of branch independence will occur in the third row of Table 1 (since 3 2 õ 1.8 õ 2 1 ), and subjects will express the preferences ($2, $40, $44) ¥ ($2, $10, $98) and FIG. 1. Rank-dependent utility theory predictions, using weights of 3/6, 2/6, and 1/6 for lowest, middle, and highest outcomes, respectively. Crossing of the curves is a violation of branch independence.
($40, $44, $136) ≥ ($10, $98, $136). since the ratios of weights straddle 1.86 ( 3 2 õ 1.86 õ 2 1 ). Changes in the utility function thus change the row(s) in which violations of branch independence would occur, holding the weights constant.
The above derivations (Expressions 2-7) show that rank-dependent utility theory implies no change in preference order when the common outcome maintains the same rank but is changed in value. The requirement of rank-dependent utility theory that there be no violations for gambles in which the common outcome maintains the same rank order is termed ''comonotonic independence '' by Wakker et al. (1994) . In Fig. 1 , the comonotonic independence prediction can be seen as the parallelism of the curves when the outcomes have the same rank (i.e., for z õ $10 and for z ú $98). 
Median Theory
1. Note that crossover pattern is opposite that in Fig. 1 .
Median Theory is a special case of rank-dependent utility theory, with weights of 0, 1, and 0 for Low, Medium, and High ranks, respectively. This model evaluconforming to Expression 7. The cumulative prospect ates each gamble as equal to its median (which minimodel also uses a power function for value of money, mizes a loss function defined as the sum of absolute u(x) Å x .88 (see Table 1 ). deviations of the outcomes about the gamble's value).
Therefore, the weighting function of cumulative pros-According to this theory, there should be a violation of pect theory (apart from any editing assumptions that branch independence in every row of the experiment would eliminate systematic violations of branch indein Table 1 . The subject should always choose the low pendence) predicts that the subject should prefer the range combination (x, y) when the common outcome is gamble containing the wider range pair (x, y) in all lowest (since the median is highest) and should always rows when the common outcome is lowest, but it imchoose the high range combination when the common plies that the subject should prefer the gamble with outcome (and the median) is highest. Median theory the smaller range pair (x, y) when the common outcome implies comonotonic independence, and it also implies is highest in the first four rows. Thus, this theory prethat changes in the highest or lowest outcome of a three dicts violations in the first four rows of Table 1 in the outcome gamble will not affect the gamble's utility. direction implied by Expression 7 and opposite that Therefore, this theory implies that there should be no implied by Expression 6. effect of rows in Table 1 on preferences.
Because the model of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) places the least weight on the middle of three equally Cumulative Prospect Theory likely outcomes, it predicts preferences and violations of branch independence in the opposite direction from Cumulative Prospect Theory, in this experiment, is those predicted by the 3:2:1 pattern or median theory, a special case of rank-dependent utility theory in which which place relatively more weight on the middle outmiddle values receive lower relative weight than higher come. The predictions of the cumulative prospect model or lower outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992, Eq. are shown in Fig. 2 , plotted for comparison with Fig.  6 ). Because of its weighting function, which has been 1. Note that cumulative prospect theory also obeys the confirmed by Wu and Gonzalez (in press) , the cumulacomonotonic independence assumption, yielding paraltive prospect model predicts the opposite pattern of lel curves for z õ $10 and z ú $98. violations of branch independence from that in Fig. 1 . As long as the middle outcome holds the least weight, Configural-Weight Theory Expression 7 follows, rather than Expression 6. For three equally likely positive outcomes, the parameters Birnbaum (1974) noted that the range model of Birnbaum, Parducci, and Gifford (1971) is a configural of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) yield weights of lowest, middle, and highest outcomes equal to .487, .177, weighted averaging model in which the relative weight of a stimulus component depends on the rank of that stimu-and .336, respectively, yielding ratios of adjacent weights of w L /w M Å 2.75 and w M /w H Å .53, respectively, lus component among the other components comprising the within-set context. Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) fit Birnbaum's (1974) range model as well as a revised rankdependent, configural weight model that provided a better fit to buying, selling, and neutral's prices. Birnbaum and Stegner's (1979, Eq. (10) ) revised model is illustrated in Fig. 3 for three equally credible sources. According to this revised model, the absolute weight of a stimulus component is transferred according to rank in proportion to the absolute weight of the stimulus that loses the weight. Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) found that the proportion of weight transferred and the direction of transfer depends on the judge's point of view. For the buyer's point of view and the neutral's, weight is transferred from the highest value to the lowest; however, for the seller's point of view, weight is transferred from the lowest to the highest. Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) a function of point of view, as did Birnbaum and Zimmermann (1995) .
For the revised version of the model (Birnbaum & Stegner, 1979, Eq. (10) ) for the buyer's point of view, rationale that subjects act as if they minimize asymthe transfer of weights results in absolute weights of metric loss functions (see also Weber, 1994) . For three-1 / .385, 1, and 1 0 .385, for the lowest, middle, and outcome gambles, however, generalization of the loss highest values, respectively. These absolute weights function approach yields configural weights that deimply relative weights of .46, .33, and .21, which conpend on both the ranks and relative spacing of the form to Expression 6; they imply violations of branch outcomes. For a squared loss function, with asymmetric independence in row two of present experiment, similar weights for over-vs underestimation, one can derive a to those described in the section on rank-dependent configural weight model that is identical to a rankutility theory for the 3:2:1 pattern of weights, illusdependent utility theory only on a limited subdomain. trated in Fig. 1 .
Over a global domain, the theory violates comonotonic independence. Comonotonic independence has been de-Configural-Weighting Derived from Asymmetric Loss scribed as the key distinction between RDU and EU Functions theories (Wakker et al., 1994) . showed that for binary gam-Because this theory can violate comonotonic indepenbles, a rank-dependent model can be derived from the dence, the loss function theory is distinct from RDU theory in general, although it can be almost equivalent to RDU in restricted situations, such as the experiment of Table 1 under most parametric assumptions. An illustration of this theory is shown in Fig. 4 . Gamble equivalent values, t, calculated to minimize an asymmetrically weighted loss function, L(t), are plotted in Fig. 4 . The function minimized is as follows:
Where u(x) Å x b , b Å .9 and r Å 1.8. These parameters were chosen to make Figs. 1 and 4 similar. Although similar, note that the curves in Fig. 4 are not parallel for comonotonic outcomes (unlike Fig. 1 ), which allows Although the loss function approach may seem more complex than rank-dependent weighting, it can be sim-1.
($5, $45, $49) vs ($5, $11, $97) pler than a purely rank-dependent model, because only one parameter may be needed to represent the asym-The numbers within the parentheses represent equally metry of the loss function for any number of stimuli, likely outcomes of a gamble. The gamble on the left rather than requiring a parameter for each rank posirepresents an equally likely opportunity of winning $5, tion. Additional information on configural weighting $45, or $49. The gamble on the right represents equal derived from loss functions is presented in Appendix A, chances to win either $5, $11, or $97. The values within with an example illustrating violation of comonotonic each choice were presented in ascending order left to independence.
right.
The booklet included 94 pairs of gambles, displayed METHOD as in the example above. Each pair of gambles was numbered and preceded by a space in which the sub-The subjects were given pairs of gambles, asked to jects were to write their judgments of strength of prefchoose between gambles, and to indicate their strength erence. of preference using two different methods in two experiments. In Experiment 1, they judged the amount of Design money they would pay to receive their preferred gamble
The experiment consisted of two subdesigns. In the rather than the other gamble in each pair. In Experifirst subdesign, 36 pairs of gambles were of the form ment 2, they rated the strength of preference on a cateof (x, y, z) vs (x, y, z), with z common to both gambles. gory rating scale.
This subdesign was a 6 by 6 factorial in which the Instructions common outcome, z, could take on 6 levels ($2, $5, $33, $42, $108, or $136) and the 6 comparisons of (x, y) and Subjects received printed instructions which were (x, y) were: ($50, $54) vs ($12, $96), ($45, $49) vs ($11, also read aloud to them. The instructions stated that $97), ($40, $44) vs ($10, $98), ($35, $39) vs ($12, $96), each gamble consisted of three equally likely slips of ($30, $34) vs ($11, $97), and ($25, $29) vs ($10, $98), paper with numbers written on them; these slips were as in Table 1 . Note that the sum of x and y is constant to be mixed and one would be selected at random to (and the range is also large and nearly constant), but determine the gamble's outcome.
the sum of x and y was varied from 104 to 54 in steps One group of subjects were presented pairs of gamof 10, with a constant small range of $4. bles and were instructed (in part), ''Your task is to de-
The second subdesign consisted of 48 pairs of gamcide which of the two gambles you would prefer to play bles, in which all six values were distinct, (x, y, z) vs and to judge how much you would pay to play your (x, y, z), constructed from an 8 by 6 factorial design preferred gamble rather than the other gamble.'' Subof the first and second gambles. The 8 levels of (x, y, z) jects circled the gamble they would prefer to play and choices were ($7, $8, $9), ($80, $8, $9), ($7, $8, $82), then judged the strength of their preference in dollars.
($80, $8, $82), ($7, $81, $9), ($80, $81, $9), ($7, $81, For purposes of data analysis, a negative sign was asso-$82) and ($80, $81, $82). (These 8 were composed of a ciated with choice of the gamble on the left. 2 by 2 by 2 factorial design of x by y by z, where x Å Another group of subjects received identical instruc-$7 or $80; y Å $8 or $81; and z Å $9 or $82). These 8 tions and stimuli, except that their task was to judge gambles were crossed with 6 (x, y, z) gambles [($13, the strength of preference on a 19-point rating scale, $14, $15), ($13, $14, $48), ($13, $14, $92), ($84, $85, labeled as follows: 09 Å Prefer the gamble on the left $15), ($84, $85, $48), or ($84, $85, $92)]. (These six were very very much more; 07 Å Prefer the gamble on the constructed from a 3 by 2 factorial design, in which z left very much more; 05 Å Prefer the gamble on the Å $15, $48, or $92 and (x, y) Å ($13, $14), or ($84, left much more; 03 Å Prefer the gamble on the left $85)). The second subdesign was included to ensure a more; 01 Å Prefer the gamble on the left slightly more; majority of trials in which all six levels would be dis-1 Å Prefer the gamble on the right slightly more; 3 Å tinct, to reduce the possibility that the subjects might Prefer the gamble on the right more; 5 Å Prefer the adopt a strategy to cancel common values, which gamble on the right much more; 7 Å Prefer the gamble seemed a possibility if all trials were from the first on the right very much more; 9 Å Prefer the gamble subdesign. on the right very very much more.
Procedure Stimuli
Each choice between gambles was presented using
The choices from both subdesigns were intermixed and printed in booklets in random order with the re-the format of the following example: strictions that successive trials did not repeat a row or Within each cell, the upper and lower numbers show the results for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Re-column of either subdesign, and no two successive trials came from the first subdesign. (Thus, no two succes-call that the (x, y) pairs have a small range and decrease in value down the rows; the (x, y) pairs have sive trials would permit a cancellation.) Each booklet contained two pages of instructions with example tri-wide range and a constant total (x / y Å 108). The percentage of choices favoring (x, y, z) declines from the als, six warm-up trials, followed by four unlabeled practice trials and 84 experimental trials.
top row to the bottom, showing increasing preference for the wide range pair as the values of (x, y) decrease. The experimenter checked the first six warm up trials. Initial examples were very simple, such as the This decrease is contrary to Median Theory. choice between ($10, $20) vs ($50, $100)-if the subject did not choose ($50, $100) in this instance, the experi-Tests of Branch Independence menter would ask the subject to explain the choice, and
Columns of Table 2 represent the value of the comdirect the subject to reread the instructions as needed.
mon outcome, z. According to branch independence, The warm up examples increased in complexity to inpreferences should not change as a function of the comclude choices like those of the actual experiment. After mon outcome. Instead, the percentages choosing (x, y, the warm ups were checked, subjects proceeded to 4 z) over (x, y, z) decrease from left to right in each row additional unlabeled practice trials (in which there as z is increased. This decrease indicates that preferwere no common branches), followed by 84 experimenences changed, and that more changed in one direction tal trials.
than the other. When z changes from smallest to Subjects completed the experiment within one hour, largest, preference switches from the gamble with the working at their own paces.
small range (x, y) to the gamble with the large range (x, y). Subjects Table 3 shows crosstabulations for Row 3 of Table 2 , The subjects were 154 undergraduates enrolled in with data for Experiment 1 shown below the diagonal Introductory Psychology, who participated for extra and data for Experiment 2 above the diagonal. For each credit. There were 106 who participated in Experiment of the 15 combinations of z and z, we can examine the 1, expressing their preferences in money, and 48 differtwo by two crosstabulation of preferring the smaller ent participants in Experiment 2, who used the cateranged gamble (z, $40, $44), designated ''S,'' or prefergory rating scale.
ring (z, $10, $98), designated ''R,'' combined with preferences between ($40, $44, z) and ($10, $98, z), labeled RESULTS again with ''R'' indicating preference for the wider range ($10, $98) and ''S'' for the smaller range. The Table 2 presents the percentage of subjects who preferred the (x, y, z) gamble over the (x, y, z) gamble. binomial sign test for correlated proportions is used to test the significance of the changes in proportion due independence and 10 showed the opposite pattern; none of these were statistically significant. For Experi-to changes in z (violations of branch independence). This test does not use instances in which choices con-ment 2, 67 crosstabs showed the same pattern as the majority in Experiment 1, 23 of these were significant form to branch independence; instead, it compares the numbers in the off-diagonal cells, where branch inde-including at least one in each row, 17 showed the opposite pattern (none of which were significant), and six pendence is violated. For example, the two by two crosstabulation in the upper, right corner of Table 3 shows showed equal splits.
Twelve of the crosstabulations represent tests of that 21 subjects out of 48 in Experiment 2 preferred ($2, $40, $44) over ($2, $10, $98) and preferred ($10, comonotonic independence. None of these crosstabs in either experiment showed a significant asymmetry in $98, $136) over ($40, $44, $136) , and only 1 violated branch independence in the opposite direction. If the violations. Five of these twelve crosstabs in Experiment 1 and seven in Experiment 2 showed the opposite pat-violations were due to random error, then the 22 violations should be equally likely to split in either direction. tern from that shown by the majority. These results are consistent with rank-dependent utility theory, which Instead, the binomial is ''significant,'' since the twotailed probability of obtaining 1 or fewer or 21 or more requires comonotonic independence to be satisfied.
However, the comonotonic changes in z in this experi-(out of 22 binomial trials with p Å .5) is .00001, which is less than .05. ment are smaller than the noncomonotonic changes, so the manipulation is not really comparable to the larger Crosstabulations corresponding to Table 3 were examined for all rows of Table 2 , with similar results. changes in z that produced significantly asymmetric violations of noncomonotonic independence. Out of 90 two by two crosstabulations (6 rows by 15 comparisons) in Experiment 1, 77 showed the same To examine individual differences, we examined two comparisons in each row for each subject, counting pattern: as z was increased, the proportion of preference for the wider range pair increased, 44 of these whether there was a violation between z Å 2 and z Å 136 and also between z Å 5 and z Å 108. There are were significant by the two-tailed sign test, including significant changes in every row. Of the 13 remaining thus 12 comparisons per subject. Out of 106 subjects in Experiment 1, only 13 subjects had no violations of crosstabs, 3 showed equal splits of violations of branch branch independence among these 12 comparisons; 66
This model was fit to all 84 cells in Design 1 and Design 2 of Experiment 1. The correlation between pre-showed more violations in the direction of switching from preferring the low range pair when z was low to dicted and obtained mean judgments was only .95. This model did most poorly in predicting judgments in De-choosing the high range pair when z was highest (the pattern in Table 2 ); 18 showed more violations of the sign 2 for cases in which one gamble dominated the other on all three values by small amounts. In those opposite type; and 9 subjects made an equal number of violations in either direction. Out of 48 subjects in cases, the judgments were more extreme than predicted by the model, as if preference judgments are a Experiment 2, only 2 had no violations for these 12 comparisons; 33 showed more violations switching mixture of strength of preference and certainty of choice. This pattern of residuals appears to be similar from preference for (x, y) to (x, y) as z was changed from lowest to highest; 10 showed more violations of to the type of higher order configural effect discussed by Birnbaum, Thompson, and Bean (in press ); Mellers, the opposite type; and 3 had an even split.
These individual violations were also examined to Chang, ; and Stuhlmacher and Stevenson (1994) , among others, in which investigate Median Theory. A person who always selects the gamble with the highest median would show a small difference that is easy to discriminate can produce a large judgment of strength of preference. 12 violations of branch independence, and would show no tendency to increase preference for the wide range (x, y) pair as x and y are decreased in successive rows. A Premium for Dominance Combining both experiments, there were 29 subjects Equation (8) was modified to allow an additive conwho had 7 or more violations among these 12 tests; 26 stant to represent a premium for dominance and also of these had more violations in the direction of the allowed the weights to be different for the cases of commedians, but only one did not show increasing preferparison with or without strict dominance on all three ence for (x, y) as x / y decreased. Therefore, we did ranked outcomes. The weights for the nondominated not find evidence that a subgroup of subjects chose concase were .28, .17, and .09 for lowest, middle, and highsistently according to medians. est outcomes, respectively. These weights satisfy Ex-In summary, the data of both experiments show the pression 6 because .28/.17 õ 1.8 õ .17/.09, predicting same pattern of violations of branch independence. The a violation in Row 3 of Tables 1 and 2. For the dominant pattern is consistent with rank-dependent utility thechoices, the weights were .26, .04, and .03, respectively, ory under the assumption of Expression 6, as depicted with a premium for dominance of $8.17. This model in Fig. 1. correlated .98 with the judgments of strength of preference in Experiment 1 and did a better job of fitting both Modeling of Strength of Preference the violations of branch independence in Design 1 and To approximate strength of preference judgments acthe strength of dominated choices in Design 2. Subjects cording to the rank-dependent model, mean judgments appeared to offer too much to get dominant choices of strength of preference were fit by the following (often more than the expected value difference); furmodel: thermore, the weights indicate that they attend mostly to the improvement in the worst outcome in these domi-Pref (x, y, z; x, y, z) nating cases. Similar results were obtained for the ratings in Experiment 2, with even more extreme ratings
in the case of dominant choices (the modal and median judgments in these cases were all 9 or 09). where x õ y õ z and x õ y õ z; Pref(x, y, z; x, y, z) is the judged strength of preference between gamble For the nondominated comparisons of Experiment 1, the ratios of weights for the group fit are w L /w M Å 1.62 (x, y, z) and gamble (x, y, z); w L , w M , and w H are the weights of the lowest, middle, and highest outcomes and w M /w H Å 1.92, which ''straddle'' 1.8 and therefore predict a violation of branch independence in Row 3 of within each gamble, respectively. This model assumes (a) that the preference judgment is proportional to the Table 1 , assuming u(x) Å x. This row indeed showed a violation in the mean judgments of strength of prefer-difference in utilities between the gambles; (b) that the utility of gambles can be represented by a rank-depen-ence, which changed signs in that row in both experiments. Analysis of variance of the strengths of prefer-dent, configural weight average of the utilities of the outcomes; and (c) that the utility of money can be ap-ence showed that all main effects and interactions in both designs were statistically significant, except for proximated by u(x) Å x for this range of outcomes. Assumptions (b) and (c) are consistent with the results of the five way interaction between the outcomes in Design 2. The main effect of the common consequence was for this range of outcomes.
.071 for lowest, middle, and highest outcomes respectively. These median weights satisfy the inequality of Expression 6, w L /w M õ w M /w H ; the majority of individuals had weights that also satisfied this inequality, consistent with the systematic pattern of violations of branch independence in Table 2 .
Power Function for Utility Produces Minimal Improvement
The model was further generalized to allow a power function approximation for the utility function, u(x) Å x b . This model assumes that subjects compare two gambles taking the difference in their certainty equivalents. For the nondominated cases, the model is as follows: (2); a and b are constants. In addition to the exponent for the utility function, this model includes a conver-strength of preference judgments; curves show predictions of the model. Note that the curves diverge to the sion factor, a, between the certainty equivalent difference and the judged value; therefore, weights can be right, as predicted by the model, which assigns greater weighting to lower outcomes. The model appears to restricted to sum to one. When b Å 1, this model is equivalent to Eq. (8). The least-squares estimates of a approximate the interaction fairly well. Similar results were also obtained for the row marginal means in De-and b were .535 and 1.10; the weights were .54, .31, and .15 for lowest, middle, and highest outcomes, re-sign 2 of Experiment 1, and similar divergent interactions were also obtained in Experiment 2 for both rows spectively. This version of the model reduced the sum of squares in the residual from 415.4 to 414.2, a trivial and columns.
The revised model was also fit to the data of each improvement. Expressions 9 were also fit to the data for nondomi-individual subject in Experiment 1, with a median correlation of .83 with the individual judgments. The me-nated choices of individual subjects, with similar results. The median value of b was .99. Only 10 of 106 dian value of the premium for dominance was $7.56; 88 of the 106 subjects had their greatest weight on subjects had improvements of more than 1% of the variance with values of b significantly different from 1; the lowest outcome for dominated comparisons; median weights for the dominated case were .20, .02, and .003. 7 of these had values of b § 5; but none produced a substantial improvement of fit. We concluded that the For the nondominated case, 70 of the subjects placed their greatest weight on the lowest outcome; 26 placed assumption of a linear function for u(x) need not be rejected in favor of a power function to fit the indivi-greatest weight on the middle outcome, and 10 subjects placed most weight on the highest outcome; median dual subject data, once rank-dependent configural weighting is allowed. weights for the nondominated case were .264, .144, and DISCUSSION EVs had been equal. Assuming that u(x) Å x, the subject would violate branch independence with equal EVs These results show systematic violations of branch if the weights straddled 1, i.e., if the subject placed the independence. The pattern is predicted by rank-depenmost or least weight on the middle outcome. If few dent configural weighting, according to Expression 6, subjects have such a pattern of weights (as suggested illustrated in Fig. 1 . The pattern is also consistent with by the present results), violations would be infrequent the predictions in Fig. 4 . Because branch independence when EVs are restricted to be equal. is a weaker form of Savage's axiom, the present results rule out EU and SEU theories and other weighted util-Median Theory Refuted ity theories that would require branch independence.
The data of Experiments 1 and 2 are not consistent with Median Theory. Although Median Theory cor-No Support for Editing of Common Components rectly predicts the direction of the violation of branch independence within rows of Table 2 (the effect of col-The present results provide no support for the theory umns), it does not account for the systematic decrease that subjects consistently edit and cancel common comin choice proportions in Table 2 as x / y is decreased ponents when making choices (Kahneman & Tversky, down the rows. Close inspection of individual data did 1979). If subjects had eliminated common outcomes not find any subgroup of subjects whose data appeared from consideration, then there would have been no sysconsistent with Median Theory. tematic violations of branch independence. It may be that subjects place less weight on a common outcome Generic Rank-Dependent Utility Theory Satisfied and perhaps more weight on differing outcomes in making their comparisons, so the general idea of placing
The present results are quite compatible with generic more emphasis on differing outcomes is still viable. rank-dependent utility theory . The viola-Nevertheless, the strong form of the principle of editing tions of branch independence observed were systematic and cancellation can be rejected in this study by the for changes in z that were not comonotonic. The pattern systematic violations of branch independence.
of violations of branch independence are consistent Editing and cancellation in the strong form may inwith greater weight on the lowest outcome, followed deed be in the repertoire of subjects, if the experiment by the middle outcome, then the highest outcome; the facilitates the use of such a strategy. In the present pattern of violations also indicates that ratios stand in experiment, fewer than half of the experimental trials the order, w L /w M õ w M /w H , as in Expression 6. would have allowed a cancellation, and no two succes-Tests of comonotonic independence did not find syssive trials would allow a cancellation. Therefore, in this tematic violations, consistent with rank-dependent experiment, the strategy of cancellation would not sufutility theory, although the present experiment does fice to handle most of the trials. Wakker et al. (1994) not provide comparable manipulations. The tests of did not employ these design features and did not decomonotonic independence involved smaller changes in tect systematic violations of independence. Weber and z. Therefore, the property of comonotonic independence Kirsner (in press) concluded that the previous failure has not been put to a strenuous test in this experiment. to find violations of independence may have been due As shown in Appendix A, minimum loss theory can to the use of a cancellation strategy in the Wakker et yield violations of comonotonic independence when the al. study. Thus, it may be that subjects can use largest outcome is taken to very high levels, and this cancellation if the experimental design promotes such implication has not yet been tested. a strategy.
Another difference between the present study and Related Research on Configural Weighting that of Wakker et al. is that they tested for violations of independence using comparisons in which the expected
The results of this study appear consistent with the pattern of weighting observed by Birnbaum & Stegner values (EVs) of the gambles were always equal. In contrast, the present study compared lower EV, smaller (1979) , Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) , , Birnbaum and Zimmermann (1995) , Birnbaum range pairs [e.g., (z, $40, $44)] against higher range, higher EV pairs [e.g., (z, $10, $98)]. The median and Beeghley (in press) and Weber and Kirsner (in press) for the buyer's point of view: lowest outcomes weights of the present study would not predict violations of branch independence in Table 1 for equal EV receive the greatest weight, followed by middle, followed by highest. One might think that the task of pairs, and extrapolation from the first row of Table 2 suggests that most subjects would have chosen the Experiment 1 may induce a buyer's viewpoint in the subjects, since they are asked to judge how much they lower range pair combined with any value of z, if the would pay to receive their preferred gamble rather than take less time, also indicating that the less favorable traits carry greater weight. the other. Although very similar choice proportions Birnbaum et al. (in press) found that strength of pref- (Table 2) were also obtained in Experiment 2, which erence judgments conformed to weak transitivity, but used a rating task that seems more neutral, it would they also found deviations from scalability, especially be interesting to study whether weights would change when one gamble dominated another by small if the task were to judge the price required to give up amounts. Similar to the findings in the present study, the preferred gamble and receive the less preferred one. judgments seemed too high when one gamble domi-The present data are also consistent with results of nates another by small differences on each value. recent studies of strength of preference between two-It is important to emphasize that the present experioutcome gambles (Birnbaum, Thompson, & Bean, in ment does not rest its test of branch independence on press). Those experiments asked subjects to express the subtractive model, as does the test of interval indepreferences between gambles consisting of two equally pendence in Birnbaum et al. (in press ). All that is relikely outcomes by stating how much they would pay quired to test branch independence is the preference to receive one gamble rather than the other or by rating relation. The analyses in Tables 1, 2, and 3 make use the strength of preference. The purpose of those studies only of the direction of preference, not the magnitudes was to assess interval independence: the effect of a of strength of preference. common consequence on the judgment of a strength of preference due to a particular contrast. Subjects judged Cumulative Prospect Model Makes Wrong Prediction the strength of preference between ($6, $8) and ($6, $74) to be less than the strength of preference between The violations of branch independence observed here ($8, $100) and ($74, $100). If strengths of preference are not consistent with predictions ( Figure 2 ) based on are monotonically related to differences in utility bethe weighting function of cumulative prospect theory tween gambles, then their results indicate that lower (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) . This weighting function outcomes receive higher weights.
implies that the middle outcome should have less Birnbaum et al. (in press) estimated the relative weight than either extreme outcome. Figure 2 , which weights of the lower and higher outcomes to be .63 and shows the pattern predicted by this weighting function, .37 for strength of preference judgments. These values was not descriptive of the present data, since the presagree with those estimated from judgments of the ''fair'' ent results (e.g., Table 2 ) show systematic violations in prices of gambles between two positive outcomes (Birnthe opposite direction from that predicted by the model baum et al., 1992) , and (as shown below) they also preof Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . dict choice-based certainty equivalents for binary gam-Tversky and Kahneman (1992) estimated their bles (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) . Results for binary weighting function from certainty equivalents of gamgambles refute the rank-dependent theory of Quiggen bles to win x with probability p and otherwise receive (1982) , which assumes that the weights of two equally $0 (x, p; 0) as follows: CE(x, p; 0) Å u 01 [W(p)u(x)]. They fit the W(p) function as follows: likely outcomes should both be 1 2 . The result of Birnbaum et al. (in press ) is analogous to that of Birnbaum (1974) , who asked subjects to judge W(p) Å p g [p g / (1 0 p) g ] 1/g , (10a) ''differences'' in likeableness between persons described by pairs of adjectives. Birnbaum found that the difference due to variation in one trait was greater if the where g is the parameter of the weighting function, common trait was high in likeableness than when the estimated to be .61; and u(x) Å x .88 . This model implies common trait was low. For example, subjects rated the an inverse-S relationship between W(p) and p, as difference in likeableness between ''LOYAL & UNDERshown by the dashed curve in Fig. 6 . According to the STANDING'' and ''LOYAL & OBNOXIOUS'' to be theory, when there are more than two outcomes, greater than the difference in likeableness between a weights of the outcomes are given by the expression, person who is ''MALICIOUS & UNDERSTANDING'' and one who is ''MALICIOUS & OBNOXIOUS.'' Birn-
baum concluded that subjects use a rank-dependent weighted average, placing the greatest weight on the where w(i) is the weight of outcome, x i ; p i is the (deculowest-valued trait in forming their integrated impresmulative) probability that an outcome is greater than sions. Birnbaum and Jou (1990) found that the comparor equal to x i given the gamble and q i is the probability ative response times were also compatible with the ''difthat an outcome is greater than x i . For the highest outcome, the weight is given by W(p); for a middle out-ference'' ratings: greater ''differences'' in likeableness and .37) that can account for Tversky and Kahneman's (1992) data also predict judgments of strength of preference (Birnbaum et al., in press) , and judgments from the neutral, or ''fair price'' point of view . Thus, in configural-weight theory, the inverse-S prediction is merely a consequence of relative weighting, and it does not imply anything about the weight of a middle outcome. See Appendix B for further implications.
However, in cumulative prospect theory, the inverse-S for binary gambles is taken as a direct measure of the cumulative weighting function, so Eq. (10b) makes the incorrect prediction that the middle of three equally likely outcomes should have the least weight.
The present failure of the weighting function derived from binary gambles to predict choices among three the generality of their model. However, the present results do not test the structural assumptions of the theory, so the basic idea of cumulative weighting has not been directly refuted here. It should be possible to come in a set of three, the weight depends not only on get direct tests of the theory by combining the approach the outcome's probability, but also the probability of of Wu and Gonzalez (in press) with the present aphigher outcomes in the same gamble. With binary gamproach within the same experiment. Systematic violables, Eq. (10a) can be fit, but Eq. (10b) remains untions of monotonicity or stochastic dominance would tested.
also refute the theory directly. The relationship between judged proportions and objective proportions has also been found to resemble an Branch Independence vs Monotonicity Violations inverse-S. Varey, Mellers, and Birnbaum (1990) noted that the inverse-S relationship can be explained by a
The property of branch independence seems similar relative ratio model in which subjective frequencies are to the property of outcome monotonicity, but they are negatively accelerated functions of objective frequendistinct. Monotonicity can be defined as follows: cies.
If gamble A and A differ in one outcome on one branch: In the configural-weight averaging models of Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) and , each weight is divided by the sum of the weights, pro-A Å (x, p(x); a 2 , p(a 2 ); . . . ; a i , p(a i )) ducing a relative ratio. According to the configural A Å (y, p(x); a 2 , p(a 2 ); . . . ; a i , p(a i )), weight model of , the absolute weight of an outcome is the product of the configural where p(x) Å p(y) is the probability to receive outcomes weight parameter, which depends on the point of view
x (or y) given choice A (or A), respectively. Monotonand rank of the outcome (apart from the probability icity requires that subjects prefer gamble A to A if and distribution), and a function of the outcome's probabilonly if they prefer gamble B to B, where ity. The relative weight (dividing each weight by the sum of the weights) is given as in the following rewrit-B Å (x, p(x); b 2 , p(b 2 ); . . . ; b i , p(b i )) ing of Birnbaum et al. (1992, Eq. (4) ):
Monotonicity requires that if a subject prefers x to y in one gamble, then the preference should be in the same direction in the context of This expression, with w L Å .63, w H Å .37, and f (p) Å p .6 , produces an inverse-S that is virtually identical to any other gamble. In contrast, branch independence requires the trade-off of two or more outcomes to be Tversky and Kahneman's weighting function, as shown by the solid curve in Fig. 6 . The same weights (.63 independent of the value of the common outcome. Birnbaum and Beeghley (in press) . They asked subjects to judge the ''highest price that a buyer should pay'' to buy each of 168 three-outcome gambles and also asked them to judge the ''least that a seller should accept to sell'' each gamble, rather than to play it. Selected results from Birnbaum and Beeghley are shown for buyer's and seller's viewpoints in Figs. 7 and 8 , respectively, plotted in a fashion similar to Figs. 1, 2, and 4. Note that the curves for wide range gambles have steeper slopes as a function of the common outcome than narrower range gambles. The pattern of violations of branch independence is similar to that shown in the present study (as in Figs. 1 and 4 but not 2 ), yet different small range gambles cross over in different points of view.
Birnbaum and Beeghley found that for the buyer's increasing the range increased the judgment when z was the highest outcome, but it decreased the judgment when z was the lowest, suggesting that the middle out-Even though outcome monotonicity seems more comcome has the greatest weight in the seller's point of pelling than the sure thing principle, outcome monoview. This change in violations is consistent with Birntonicity has been violated in studies of judgment. For baum and Stegner's (1979) theory that point of view example, found that subjects affects the configural weights of the outcomes. Birnjudge the gamble ($96, p, $0) to be worth more than baum and Beeghley (in press) estimated the weights ($96, p, $24) when p § .8, but the order of judgments of lowest, middle, and highest outcomes to be .47, .30, is reversed when p õ .8. Similar results have been and .07 for the buyer's point of view and .23, .44, and obtained by Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) ; Birnbaum .18 for the seller's point of view, respectively, with u(x) (1992); Mellers, Weiss, and Birnbaum (1992) ; Birn-Å x. baum and Thompson (in press); and Mellers, Berretty, For the present study, the relative weights for nonand . Birnbaum and Sutton (1992) found that although judgments show consistent violations of monotonicity, subjects rarely violate the principle in direct choices between the gambles. Von Winterfeldt, Chung, Luce, and Cho (in press) found different rates of violations with different procedures. They found few violations when gambles were ordered according to certainty equivalents determined using PEST, a sequential, staircase method for determining certainty equivalents. However, and Birnbaum and Thompson (in press) found violations of monotonicity when certainty equivalents based on choices between gambles and a fixed set of amounts of money were compared. Because monotonicity is a fundamental assumption of many utility theories, it is important to pin down the situations in which it is satisfied or not. ings of attractiveness and prices assigned to binary gambles (Tversky et al., 1988) . However, tests of scale Birnbaum and Beeghley (in press ). All three studies were fit with the same utility function.
Judgment vs Choice
represent the value of a gamble as the sum of weighted products of a function of probability and a function of the outcome. dominated comparisons are .51, .33, and .16 for low,
The data also show that subjects do not necessarily medium, and high value outcomes. Relative weights cancel common outcomes when comparing gambles. from Birnbaum and Beeghley (in press) are shown in The particular pattern of violations of branch indepen- Table 4 . All three situations are compatible with the dence are inconsistent with the weighting function of same utility function, u(x) Å x; the different rank orders probability used in cumulative prospect theory. Inproduced by the different tasks are explained entirely stead, the violations show the opposite pattern: when by changing configural weights. Although the preferthe common outcome is the lowest in each gamble, peoence orders differ in each case, the ratios of weights ple tend to prefer the narrower range pair; when the conform to the same inequality (Expression 6), which common outcome is highest, they tend to prefer the implies a similar pattern of violations of branch indewider range pair. pendence in all three studies.
These results are compatible with rank-dependent In this case, despite differences in weighting, judgutility theory, with the assumption that the lowest outments and choices seem to agree, because patterns of come receives the greatest weight, followed by the midjudgments in both viewpoints agree with the pattern of dle value, and least weight is given to the highest outviolations observed in the present choice experiments. come; furthermore, the ratio of weight of the middle These findings suggest that the pattern of violations is outcome to the highest is greater than the ratio of the not due to some process of comparison, such as editing, lowest to the middle outcome. That comparison of rathat would be unique to choice experiments, but rather tios appears to hold for choice experiments, and for that the pattern is produced by a combination process judgment experiments involving buying and selling that is common to all three experiments.
prices, despite changing configural weights in the three tasks.
Preference Reversals and Scale Convergence
The present experiment found no systematic evidence of violation of comonotonic independence, but the The configural weights in Table 4 can be used with experiment did not provide a strenuous test of this the same utility function to explain different preference property. The theory that configural weighting is due orders for different points of view in the judgment task to minimization of a loss function is also consistent and for choice. Changing preference orders between with the present results, with the assumption that it different situations are sometimes termed ''preference is more costly to overestimate the value of a chosen reversals.'' Contingent weighting theory (Tversky, Sat- gamble than to underestimate its value. tath, & Slovic, 1988) is a theory of preference reversals that should not be confused with configural weight theory. In contingent weight theory, the relative weights APPENDIX A: MINIMIZING ASYMMETRIC LOSS FUNCTIONS CAN VIOLATE of probabilities vs outcomes depends on the task;
COMONOTONIC INDEPENDENCE
whereas in configural weight theory, the weights of higher or lower outcomes depend on the configuration of outcomes and the subject's point of view. Contingent Suppose we choose t to minimize the following loss function: weight theory was fit to the relationship between rat-solution is between x b and y b , then we can minimize the loss function by taking the derivative of the following equation with respect to t, setting it to zero, and solving for t as follows: weighted average of the utilities of the gambles. By a similar derivation, the case in which the solution is between y b and z b leads to the following solution:
Suppose that r Å 2. If w L Å w H Å w, then this expression This equation is also a rank-dependent, configural leads to expected utility theory. The solution for t in weight average. However, in second case, the absolute this case is t Å Swu(x i )/Sw. For equally likely outcomes, weight of y b has changed from the weight of a high in p(x) Å w/Sw for all outcomes. Because t represents ex-Eq. (13) to the weight of a low in Eq. (14). Because the pected utility, one would need to apply the u-inverse denominator also changes, the relative weights of the function to convert t to a cash equivalent. other two outcomes change as well. To convert to a cash When the weights of over-and underestimation are value, one would apply the inverse function to the value not equal (w L x w H ), the loss function is said to be of t at the solution [i.e., t (1/b) ]. asymmetric. From the premise of an asymmetric loss Although these equations are equivalent to rank-defunction, we can derive an interesting family of configpendent utility theory on a given subdomain (outcomes urally weighted models.
The case of r Å 1 leads to the median and its generalizations. This situation is sometimes illustrated with the example of the ''newsboy'' problem. The newsboy must buy his papers to sell, faced with uncertainty concerning the number of customers that will buy papers any given day. If he buys too many papers, he loses the cost of each unsold paper. If he buys too few, he loses the chance to make profits on those sales. The cost of each paper and the cost of each lost profit are in general not equal, so this loss function is asymmetric. This case leads to the conclusion that the best solution is a percentile that depends on the asymmetry of costs. With symmetric costs, the solution is the median.
The case of r Å 2 is convenient to study because calculus gives us simple, unique solutions. For three outcomes, however, there two cases to consider, which give different equations for the solutions. Consider three outcomes, x õ y õ z. Suppose u(x) Å x b . If the are chosen so that the solution is always in the same powerful constraints on the configural weighting functions. interval), this model can violate comonotonic independence in a large enough experiment, when comonotonic For three outcomes with unequal probabilities, we can rewrite branch independence as follows: changes in the outcomes move the solution from one subdomain to another. An example of violation of comonotonic independence is shown in Figs. 9 and 10, in which b Å 1, r Å 2, w L Å 2, w H Å 1. The values of t that (x, p; y, q; z, r) preferred to (x, p; y, q; z, r) if and only if (x, p; y, q; z, r) preferred to (x, p; y, q; z, r) .
(15) minimize the loss function are plotted as a function of the common outcome, z, with separate curves for the gamble (z, $38, $39) and the gamble (z, $29, $51).
Note that the curves in Fig. 9 cross when z is in-Where (x, p; y, q; z, r) is the gamble to win x with creased from $55 to $105. Any crossover is a violation probability p, y with probability q, and z with probabilof branch independence; because this crossover occurs ity r; p / q / r Å p / q / r Å 1. when z is increased without changing the rank order It is useful to analyze a choice experiment with reof the outcomes, this crossover represents a violation spect to rank-dependent configural weight theory in of comonotonic independence.
which the relative weights of equally likely outcomes It is instructive to plot the difference between the depend entirely on the ranks of the outcomes. Outcurves, as in Fig. 10 . Note that for values of z above comes are selected so that 0 õ z õ x õ x õ y õ y õ $100, the difference between the curves is constant. In z. We restrict attention to the case in which p Å p this region, comonotonicity will be satisfied. This loss and q Å q; r Å 1 0 p 0 q (With equal distributions function theory has an interesting psychological interthe denominator of the relative weights is constant, pretation. For the case of three outcomes, the subject allowing common components to be subtracted off in treats them as either one low outcome and two high configural weight theory). Consider the preference relaones, or as two low outcomes and one high one. Thus, tion, ¥, between two such gambles, with a common ($29, $51, $55) would be treated as one low outcome value of z or z that is lowest or highest outcome, respec-(29) and two high ones (51 and 55). However, in the tively. case of ($29, $51, $105), the subject interprets the array Suppose as two low values and one high one. Thus, the spacing of the outcomes (as well as their ranks) determines (z, r; x, p; y, q) ¥ (z, r; x, p; y, q) . their weights. Changing the value of the highest outcome caused the medium outcome to change weight and from that of a high to that of a low; furthermore, since the total weight increased, the relative weight of the (x, p; y, q; z, r) ≥ (x, p; y, q; z, r) . lowest and highest outcomes also decreased.
If there are many outcomes, this loss function ap-In order to observe this violation of branch indepenproach is simpler than the full rank-dependent model, dence, the ratios of successive weights must ''straddle'' because there are only two weights. However, the thethe ratio of differences in utility as follows: ory adds the metric parameter, r, and the additional aspect of spatial configuration: the spacing among the w L (p) w M (q) õ u(y) 0 u(y) u(x) 0 u(x) õ w M (p) w H (q) .
(16) values determines the weights assigned to the outcomes as well as their ranks.
The opposite pattern of violations of branch indepen-APPENDIX B: GENERALIZATION OF ANALYSIS dence is also possible, when the following holds:
OF BRANCH INDEPENDENCE
The findings of the present experiment, that people w L (p) w M (q) ú u(y) 0 u(y) u(x) 0 u(x) ú w M (p) w H (q) .
(17) violate branch independence and do not edit and eliminate common components in comparison, suggests that the approach of Eqs. (1-7) can be applied to more gen-By conducting a series of experiments with different probabilities (p and q), each one like that in Table 1 , eral situations to learn more about patterns of configural weighting. In this section, we sketch out a general-in which different values of the utility interval are varied to determine a violation of branch independence, it ization to situations involving outcomes of unequal probability and to situations with different numbers of is possible to obtain an ordering on the ratios of weights for any pair of probabilities. One can then construct outcomes. Violations of branch independence provide
